

International Competition and the Onset of Civil War

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Abstract

A country's international environment and relationship with its neighbors can affect its risk of civil war, because beliefs about potential intervention can disrupt domestic bargaining. Two factors shape how expectations of intervention cause the outbreak of fighting. First, political distance with a third party determines whether rebels or governments expect support. Second, the level of international competition amongst the neighbors can encourage or constrain third parties' willingness to intervene. These factors interact to produce two pathways for international factors to cause civil war. Politically moderate countries in heterogeneous areas are at the highest risk of experiencing civil war, while political outliers in homogenous neighborhoods are also at increased risk of conflict. I estimate several empirical models using spatial regression techniques and find consistent and robust evidence for a relationship between international competition and the risk of civil war onset.

1 Introduction

How does a country's international environment affect its risk of civil war? The UCDP/Prio dataset on external supporters for warring parties shows that at least 75% percent of conflicts between 1976 and 2011 experienced intervention on the side of the government, the rebels, or both. If domestic actors have expectations about intervention, then international factors will affect the prospects for domestic conflict. However, because conflicts can attract the intervention of multiple actors, often on opposing sides, we also have to consider how the relationship amongst potential interveners affect decisions about intervention. We therefore need to understand how international political competition affects a country's risk of civil war.

To answer this question, we need theories of 1) what countries compete over; and 2) domestic bargaining in the shadow of intervention. First, theories of political order and organized violence suggest that political actors compete over how states should organize themselves in terms of domestic political arrangements and institutions (Owen IV 2010, Wagner 2007, McDonald 2015, Gunitsky 2017). Second, theories of civil war onset and external interventions show that potential intervention by a third party can affect domestic bargaining (Cetinyan 2002, Thyne 2006, Kuperman 2008, Cunningham 2016). These theories provide some first principles as I specify a theory of why and when the threat of third-party intervention affects domestic conflict. I argue that because civil wars are struggles over domestic political arrangements, interventions offer an alternative short of interstate war for states wishing to maintain or spread their political preferences to others. In order to specify when external threats cause civil war, we have to consider two factors: a country's political distance from its neighbors, and the political heterogeneity of its neighbors. Political distance determines whether a country would

support the government or the rebels in another country's civil war. However, potential interveners must also consider other nearby states and their political preferences, because the level of international competition amongst them determines whether intervention is necessary and worthwhile. Considering political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity jointly suggest two distinct patterns of civil war onset caused by the threat of intervention. First, when neighborhoods are heterogeneous, countries of opposing ideologies compete to dominate the region. They seek to intervene in countries that do not have support from other states. International competition drives domestic conflict in those politically moderate countries, because they are stuck in the middle. In the late 1960s, Pakistan was a mixed regime, with autocratic Afghanistan and democratic India both supporting rebel groups in the country. Second, when neighborhoods are homogenous, political outliers are at heightened risk of civil war because the dominating states will seek to impose their political preferences on the rest. Turkey was the target of frequent rebel-sided intervention in the mid-1980s, as the authoritarian regimes in Syria and Iran provided aid to the Kurdish rebel group PKK.

I test these hypotheses through a series of empirical models, using spatial data to measure a state's political distance to its neighbors and the political heterogeneity of its neighborhood. I find that both political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity are positively associated with increased risk of civil war onset, but the effects are conditional on the other variable being at or near the minimum value. A politically moderate country with average neighborhood heterogeneity is 12 times as likely to experience civil war as a similar country in a completely homogenous neighborhood. Similarly, an average political outlier in a homogenous neighborhood is four times as likely to experience civil war as a moderate country in the same neighborhood. The results are robust to several alternative estimators. Furthermore, I find that more policy-

specific measures of disagreements, such as ideal points based on United Nations General Assembly voting (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017), are not associated with the risk of civil war onset, which suggests that conflict is driven by more deep-seated issues, such as regime type or ideology.

My results imply that empirical models of civil war should account for structural factors such as the distribution of political preferences, because otherwise we risk biased estimates of monadic or dyadic predictors of civil war. The role of neighborhood heterogeneity also suggests an underappreciated risk of domestic political shocks. When countries suddenly shift political preferences, through coups or revolutions, these shocks skew the international distribution of political preferences. If a new regime promotes its preferences abroad, it can cause ripple effects throughout the region. For instance, the Russian Revolution helped set off a wave of civil wars across Europe (Payne 2011). We should therefore situate theories of civil war onset and outcomes in a nested structure, because international factors affect domestic processes differently depending on a country's political preferences and its relationship with its neighbors.

2 The international dimensions of civil wars

A country's international environment can affect its domestic politics in several ways. Hostile neighbors can weaken domestic governments through subversion and coercion (Lee 2018), and conflicts can spread across the border (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). For weak states, the risk of contagion is even higher, as the government is unable to withstand outside forces (Braithwaite 2010, Maves and Braithwaite 2013). Given the effects of such interference, uncertainty about what external actors might do can disrupt domestic bargaining between governments and op-

position groups (Wagner 2007, pp. 229-230). Potential rebel-sided intervention can increase the risk of civil war (Cetinyan 2002, Thyne 2006, Kuperman 2008, Poast 2015), and in some instances the opposition actively seeks out foreign support (Huang 2016).¹ While expected rebel support increase the risk of civil war, signals or expectations of government-sided intervention have a pacifying effect (Thyne 2006, Cunningham 2016) because it tells the opposition groups that the costs of fighting will outweigh the chances of winning.

While most studies of interventions into civil wars have focused on the effects of intervention on conflict duration (Regan 1996, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Regan 2002, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008, Cunningham 2010), several studies have examined why states intervene, particularly on the side of rebels. Providing external support for a warring party can be cheaper than a direct military confrontation, so states support rebels as a form of outsourcing of war-fighting (Salehyan 2010, Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011), and some use interventions short of direct confrontation as a screening device for assessing an opponent's resolve (Rapport 2015). The specific goals of the interventions vary. States can intervene to ensure access to economic markets (Aydin 2012), while U.S. humanitarian interventions are driven by liberal ideals rather than strict national interests (Choi 2013).

Though some interventions pursue policy objectives, most policy disagreements do not result in civil wars or threats of intervention. Interventions can be both costly and risky, so policy disagreements are a necessary, but not sufficient explanation for intervention. Civil wars substantially increase the likelihood of interstate disputes (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008), and states cannot necessarily escape these risks by resorting to proxy warfare. Furthermore,

¹The theoretical model in Cetinyan (2002) requires additional assumptions, such as private information, for intervention to cause domestic bargaining breakdown. Otherwise, intervention only affects demands made in equilibrium, not the risk of war.

while rebel-sided intervention may be used to achieve specific policy concessions, the strategy itself has a more profound effect on the target. Civil wars are conflicts over domestic political arrangements, so supporting rebels means supporting efforts to remake the state, either by capturing the state or seceding from it. Because of these issues, the stakes of the civil war must be sufficiently high to warrant intervention by a third party.

Intervention might then hinge on the relationship between the relevant actors. Ethnic ties between rebel groups and third parties can explain intervention, because they draw neighbors into the conflict to help or save their brethren (Saideman 2001, 2002, Gleditsch 2007). However, sometimes the decision to intervene is based not on who the rebels are, but who they are fighting. The empirical pattern of interventions show that states are more likely to intervene on the side of rebels if the civil war government or one of its allies is an enduring rival (Findley and Teo 2006, Maoz and San-Akca 2012). These state-centric relationships can thus offer a more general explanation for intervention, even if ethnic ties are stronger predictors for a subset of cases.

One issue with using rivalry to explain conflict, and thus intervention in this context, is that most definitions of rivalry, including enduring rivalry, are based on prior conflict (Goertz and Diehl 1993, pp. 156-60). Alternatively, we can consider competing political preferences as causing or perpetuating rivalry. Wagner (2007, ch. 6) argues that variations in domestic bargains imply different incentives for revisionist policies, because institutions or domestic coalitions can more or less restrain leaders from pursuing private gains. While some states are territorially satisfied, and some might be able to offer each other guarantees of mutual security, others have more revisionist preferences. Some leaders can also leverage race, religion, ethnicity, or ideology to create political mass mobilization, which in turn reduces an executive's ability to act predatory (Wagner 2007, pp. 202-203). Because we live in a world of heterogeneous states,

where differences might spur conflict, states have an incentive to remake others' domestic political arrangements.

If so, we can understand interventions and counter-interventions as the product of political competition. Owen IV (2010) argues that transnational ideological networks are key to understanding why states promote regime change in other states, because elite polarization drives competition over ideas and political preferences. Since states have relationships with multiple states, we must also consider regional or international competition beyond the dyadic setting, because changes at the structural level affect patterns of civil war (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Westad (2005) shows that the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in numerous third-world countries, often on opposing sides in the same conflict, to spread their preferences and build international order. Similarly, Europe in the first half of the 20th century saw a wave of civil wars brought about by revolutionary sentiment (Payne 2011). These periods illustrate how international competition result in efforts to overthrow the governments of other states. The threat of intervention thus depends on international processes driven in part by ideological competition. We observe similar dynamics after great-power wars as well, because post-war settlements influence the regime type of new and old states (McDonald 2015, Gunitsky 2017). The spatial distribution and diffusion of domestic political arrangements should therefore be seen as the product of international processes. However, these arguments have not been applied to the risk of civil war, nor do we have empirical findings to test their implications. In the next section, I specify a theory of how international competition can cause domestic conflict.

3 Intervention and international competition

In this section I lay out my theory of how expectations of intervention affect the likelihood of civil war. Since domestic bargaining can break down for several reasons, my theory focuses on when and what type of intervention is more or less likely and how those expectations affect the likelihood of civil war.² In short, I argue that the risk of civil war is increasing in the likelihood of rebel-sided intervention, but decreasing in the likelihood of government-sided intervention. Whether the government, the rebels, or both are expected to receive external support depends on a country's political distance to its neighbors and the level of international competition.

To explain why states intervene in other states' civil wars, specifically on the side of rebels, we must examine the nexus of domestic and international politics. The political arrangements of a country represent a bargain, which implies that the arrangement can be renegotiated, often through violence. We typically think of this process as involving a government and one or more armed groups fighting over control of the entire state or some portion of it. Whether rebels hope to topple the government or merely secede from it, the fighting is an attempt to remake the status quo.

The ability to renegotiate domestic political arrangements matters in an international context, for two reasons. First, rebel groups are usually less powerful than the government, so external support can be desirable, and even essential, for fighting. Some rebels might prefer autonomy over support, but I assume that most groups prefer support because it gives them a

²There might be several mechanisms causing the outbreak of war. Expectations about intervention can cause moral hazard by lowering the expected costs of rebellion and increasing the rebels' expected likelihood of victory (Kuperman 2008), but Cetinyan (2002) argues that factors such as private information or commitment problems must be present. I assume that these problems are inherent in these kinds of strategic interactions, so I focus on when disagreement is more or less likely. We can also imagine the presence of a third party having a pacifying effect, if there are situations where the government successfully buys off rebels that would otherwise fight. If that is the case, then my empirical model is a conservative test of my theory.

fighting chance.³ We have numerous examples of opposition groups even lobbying third parties for support in rebellion and civil wars. For instance, members of the Afghan Mujahideen made several public trips to the United States to lobby for support during the 1980s, while the Front the Libération Nationale in the Algerian War of Independence played off opposing sides during the Cold War to help it achieve international recognition (Connolly 2002).

Second, states can disagree on a wide range of issues, but the risk of conflict depends on the depth of disagreement. States might disagree on the particulars of trade policies such as tariffs, or they might disagree on fundamental issues of political arrangements. If it is the latter, the disagreement is more likely to cut across a wide range of issues, which gives the actors a stake in each other's domestic politics and especially institutions. Institutions matter in this regard because they can be remade, unlike some sources of state's preferences such as factor endowments. Because institutions aggregate preferences, interventions are an attempt at remaking institutions in order to affect state behavior. Disagreeing states will therefore seek to change the other's institutions, because it will lessen bargaining friction between states. This is not to say that states do not fight over smaller issues, but rather that fundamental disagreements over political arrangements should explain more conflicts for two reasons. First, even parochial disagreements often stem from deep-seated disagreements. Second, if states match ways and means to political ends, then remaking another country's political arrangements is more appropriate if disagreements are fundamental rather than narrow.

However, most disagreements between states do not end in war, because fighting is costly. Instead, I argue that a relatively attractive outside option for states is to cause or support con-

³If opposition groups prefer peace to fighting with external support, then we would expect the likelihood of civil war decrease in the likelihood of rebel-sided intervention. However, given that most external rebel support is limited to the supply of arms and money, I expect these cases to be in the minority. If groups with strict preferences for independent fighting exist, then my research design should be a conservative test of my hypotheses.

flict within another state. Intervention is not cost- or risk-free, but depending on the stakes at hand, it might be preferable to no civil war or a doomed rebellion. States can promise support to an opposition party or group in the event of a civil war, and this support can range from giving money to sending military advisors or special forces troops. The resulting conflict can be beneficial to the external supporter, because a civil war can remake the domestic political arrangements, which can be the source of the original disagreement, or weaken the regime through destruction or some power-sharing agreement with the rebels. A recent example would be Russian support for separatists in Ukraine. Instead of sending in tanks, Russia sent arms and advisors, which significantly weakened the central government while preventing the conflict from expanding beyond Ukraine. Target governments can take steps to prevent intervention, and thus civil war, but there are several obstacles to reaching a peaceful agreement with a potential rebel supporter. A third party might not be able to credibly commit *ex ante* not to intervene once a civil war starts, and commitment problems between governments and rebels prevent domestic agreements (Walter 1997), which could be a prerequisite for an interstate agreement.

The implication of civil wars being an opportunity for addressing interstate disagreements is that countries who are politically different from their surroundings are at greater risk of rebel-sided intervention. The larger the political difference, the more likely it is that at least one other state will intervene in a civil war. Opposition groups observe these differences and disagreements between their government and foreign governments, and adjust their expectations accordingly.


In contrast, the threat of intervention on the side of the government should deter rebellion because it raises the expected costs of fighting. Historically, external government supporters have often been either regional or global powers with substantial capabilities to aid a civil war

government. Opposition groups are therefore less willing to fight when facing a potentially strengthened government relative to one with no powerful friends. While government-sided interventions have a pacifying effect, intervention on one side increases the risk of intervention on the other side (Findley and Teo 2006). Thus, when both sides might get support, these expectations have countervailing effects on the likelihood of civil war onset. Under those circumstances, the risk of civil war should be higher than when only a government supporter exists, but lower than when only a rebel supporter exists.

A country's risk of civil war does not hinge solely on potential disagreements with other states. The level of international competition amongst other relevant states determines their general willingness to intervene in a civil war, and this competition is driven by the distribution of political preferences amongst those states. Consider how great and rising powers often fight over regional control and try to impose their political preferences on other states. They seek to change other states because opposing ideologies threaten domestic political arrangements, so a heterogenous environment spurs competition between blocks. This competition then increases the willingness of these countries to intervene in civil wars. For example, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in numerous third-world countries to shape the international system. Similarly organized countries might also have strong disagreements, such as the Soviet Union and China or Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia competing in Yemen, but those are often over context-specific issues, rather than broad issues that apply to a wide range of states and periods. We should therefore expect to see countries' willingness to intervene in civil wars increase as the distribution of political preferences widens.

These examples raise the question of which states are relevant to a given state's risk of intervention and civil war. I argue that we should consider a country's international neighborhood.


Figure 1: The varying risk to *A* in a homogenous neighborhood



For most countries the most relevant countries in terms of competition are those closest to it. While major powers frequently intervene in civil wars, they rarely do so alone. Of the 122 conflicts with outside intervention in the period 1976-2010 (according to the UCDP External Support dataset), 92 included the involvement of at least one major power. However, 19 of those cases had no non-major powers involved, while 73 included both major power(s) and other state(s). Relatedly, contiguous neighbors rarely intervene when major powers are not involved (8 conflicts without major powers, versus 27 with major power involvement). One explanation for this pattern is that neighbors, contiguous or not, offer avenues for intervention because they have local contacts or other resources, so major powers can enable or exploit local conflicts, but also depend on local partners. For instance, the Afghan Civil War was driven by superpower rivalry. However, the United States was dependent on Pakistan to serve as a quartermaster to the Afghan Mujahideen. Smaller, regional powers also rely on proxies. Iran uses Hezbollah in Lebanon to intervene in the Israel-Palestine conflict. As such, these out-of-neighborhood powers might encourage conflict, but neighborhood competition offers a necessary condition for competition between distant but more powerful states.

However, the mechanisms of political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity are not

Figure 2: The varying risk to *A* in a heterogeneous neighborhood



separate, but instead interact to produce two distinct pathways. First, political distance only increases the risk of civil war onset when a neighborhood is relatively homogeneous. To understand this it is best to consider the distribution of political ideal points on a single dimension (see **Figure 1**), and what happens if there are at least two potential interveners (countries *B* and *C*) near a given country *A*. If a country's political distance is small (i.e. it is close to the mean), a homogeneous neighborhood means it is close to everyone. There is thus little disagreement amongst the states, so there are few incentives for the two neighbors to intervene in a civil war on the rebels' side. Furthermore, these neighbors are most likely to support the government in the event of a civil war, which in turn should deter rebellion. But if a country is far away from the rest, then the risk of intervention increases. The dominating states *B* and *C* would intervene in the outlier to complete the process of homogenizing the region, because all else being equal they would prefer *A* to be closer in terms of political preferences.

Second, neighborhood heterogeneity only increases the risk of civil war onset when a country is politically moderate (i.e. close to the mean). Consider again the the distribution of ideal points (**Figure 2**). If a country has a small political distance, increased international competition results in it becoming stuck in the middle of potentially competing factions. As the neigh-

neighborhood becomes increasingly heterogeneous, there might be potential interveners on both sides, with *B* and *C* now being on opposite ends of the political spectrum. For instance, a mixed regime might face threats from both autocracies and democracies seeking to bring it over to their respective sides. In the context of the Cold War, this can explain why intervention in countries in the Global South was more prevalent than intervention in the superpowers' spheres of influence in Europe. If a country is politically distant, however, an increasingly heterogeneous neighborhood means it is moving farther away from some (country *B*), but closer to others (country *C*). For country *B*, intervention in the latter context should be costlier than in the former, in part because intervention might trigger counter-interventions from country *C*, which would prefer the current government stay in power. This is not to say that intervention in a rival's ally or partner will not happen, but it should be cheaper to intervene in a politically moderate country. We therefore get two conditional hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (Domination) *The risk of a civil war starting in a country in a given year increases in its political distance to its neighbors when the neighboring states are homogeneous, but decreases as the neighbors become more heterogeneous.*

Hypothesis 2 (Competition) *The risk of a civil war starting in a country in a given year increases in neighborhood heterogeneity when the country's political distance is low, but decreases as its political distance increases.*

The interaction of political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity then produces two distinct patterns, and we should expect to see civil wars start because of competition more often than domination (see **Table 1**). States in homogenous regions might intervene in outliers, but

Table 1: Relative risk of civil war

	Heterogenous neighborhood	Homogenous neighborhood
High distance	Low	Moderate
Low distance	High	Lowest

they might also coordinate on other policies, such as sanctions or diplomatic pressure. In competitive regions, however, countries have a harder time coordinating with others because there are more adversaries and fewer potential allies, so we should expect to see them turn to violence more often than dominating factions.

Lastly, it is worth considering the difference between the two on-diagonal cases: politically moderate countries in homogenous neighborhoods and political outliers in heterogenous neighborhoods. In both cases, the risk of civil war is lower than in the off-diagonal cases, but one has a higher risk than the other. In the former, rebel-sided intervention is unlikely, because all the nearby states are similar in their political preferences, and any intervention in the event of civil war is likely to be on the government’s side, thus depressing the risk of civil war. In the latter case, however, the pacifying effect of government-sided intervention is ameliorated by the risk of rebel-sided intervention. We should therefore expect the risk of civil war to be moderately high in cases of political outliers in heterogenous neighborhoods.

4 Modeling civil war onset

In this section I specify several logit models of the risk of civil war with country-clustered robust standard errors . The unit of analysis is country-year, and the sample covers all countries in the system in the period 1946-2000 (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Using Sambanis’ definition, a civil war is defined as having caused more than 1,000 deaths in total, including battle deaths and

civilian deaths, and lasted for at least three years.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

	mean	sd	min	max
Polity2 distance	4.504595	3.996208	.0000907	17.20913
Polity2 neigh. heterogeneity	6.197021	1.947941	0	13.43503
Polity2 neigh. count	17.72933	11.97122	2	61
Liberal component index	.4852089	.2743802	.0336004	.9788051
Liberal distance	.193069	.1626001	.0000265	.8754029
Liberal neigh. heterogeneity	.222683	.0625896	.019139	.4731299
Liberal neigh. count	17.72933	11.97122	2	61
<i>N</i>	5530			

The dependent variable is coded 0 for all country-years with no war, 1 for the year the war started, and missing for periods of ongoing war. While this causes some wars started during another war to be dropped from the sample, the alternative would be problematic because countries with ongoing wars might have systematically different risk of a new war starting. As Hegre and Sambanis (2006, p. 523) note, this would necessitate additional controls and consideration of how ongoing wars affect the existing explanatory variables. In the full sample, there are 119 cases of civil war onset, which is 1.93% of the total number of observations in the dataset (6,151), but the number is smaller when the model is estimated due to missing data (**Table 1**).

In order to capture disagreements between states (political distance) and the level of international competition (neighborhood heterogeneity), I must first identify a way to measure a country's political position. Because I theorize that states form disagreements over fundamental issues of political arrangements rather than specific policy issues, I look for measures of a country's deep-seated political preferences as represented by regime type or ideology. I focus on two measures to estimate two sets of models: Polity2 and the Liberal component index from the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2016, pp. 46-7).⁴ Polity2 is a continuous

⁴I refer to the two models interchangeably as the Polity2 or Institutional model and the Ideological or Liberal

measure of a country's level of democracy based on five subcomponents that capture various aspects of autocracies and democracies, with a higher score meaning a country is more democratic and vice-versa. Because the measure is largely based on institutional features, I also construct another variable using the Liberal component index. The continuous measure captures the extent to which liberal principles of democracy are achieved, with a higher score meaning a country is more liberal and vice-versa. As such, the two measures distinguish between the institutions of the state and the ideological content of its policies and laws.⁵ The two variables are highly correlated (0.836), but differ for certain countries and periods. For instance, El Salvador is rated as having a moderately high level of democracy in 1992 (7 on Polity2), but below average on the Liberal component index (0.412). Jordan in 1999, on the other hand, is considered a mixed regime (-2 on Polity2), but is above average on the Liberal component index (0.535).

For each of these variables, I construct a continuous measure of the absolute political distance between a given country's value and the average of other countries as weighted by the inverse minimum distance, defined as an inverse distance-weights matrix W (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008):


$$W_{ij} = \frac{\frac{1}{d_{ij}}}{\sum_{j=1}^n \frac{1}{d_{ij}}}, \quad (1)$$

where i and j denote country pairs and d is the minimum distance between them.⁶ The W matrix produces a measure of the inverse distance between two countries which is normalized model.

⁵Neither measure captures all forms of international conflict and competition. For instance, it cannot distinguish between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nor can it capture differences between Sunni and Shia countries. However, measures that would capture these dynamics would then be bound by region or to some specific subsample, rather than a broad sample of countries.

⁶To facilitate the transformation of cells of contiguous neighbors, I add 1 kilometer to every off-diagonal cell in the matrices.

Figure 3: Changes in Mexico's and Paraguay's political positions.



by the sum of the inverse distance between country i and all other countries j . Countries closer to i are weighted more than more distant ones, and contiguous neighbors are weighted particularly high. *Polity2 distance* and *Liberal distance* therefore capture the institutional and ideological distance, respectively, between a country and its neighbors, and both measures exhibit substantial variation across units and over time. For instance, between 1990 and 1999, Mexico's distance to its neighbors went from 6.33 to 2.75 (*Polity2 distance*) as its neighbors democratized (see **Figure 3**). For others, the distance is affected by both a country's change and its neighbors' change. Paraguay's political distance has ebbed and flowed as South America has gone through waves of regime change, but the distance sharply decreased once Paraguay democratized after 1989.

Next, I construct two continuous measures of the level of heterogeneity of the surrounding

countries (within 2500km), operationalized as the variance of their level of democracy and their liberalism.⁷ The more heterogeneous the region, the higher the value. For instance, Malaysia's region has been particularly heterogenous in terms of liberalism, consistently over 0.42 in the period 1975-1997.


The distributions of both political distance variables are skewed with a long right tail (**Figure 4**). Furthermore, when divided into subsamples of observations with and without civil war occurring, we see that the former group tends towards higher political distance and regional heterogeneity. However, the sample does not have many extreme outliers. The distributions of the heterogeneity variables are less skewed, but the subsample with conflict onset has high spikes in density above the mean for both *Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity* and *Liberal neighborhood heterogeneity*. Looking at specific observations in the sample, there are numerous cases of civil war onset with above-mean values for the distance and heterogeneity variables, including Israel in 1987 (Polity2 distance = 11.98), Lebanon in 1958 (Polity2 neigh. het. = 8.86), Zaire in 1996 (Liberal distance = .43), and Russia in 1999 (Liberal neigh. het. = .31).

Because my theory specifies an interaction between a country's political distance to its neighbors and the neighborhood's heterogeneity, I include an interaction term in both the Polity2 model and the Liberal model. I also include control variables that are strong predictors of civil war onset and can affect domestic politics either in the observed country or neighboring countries.⁸ The number of states in a neighborhood can affect the risk of intervention and interna-

⁷The specific width of a band is inherently arbitrary, but I use a relatively wide band to avoid too much missing data in the sample. If it is too narrow, too many countries have too few neighbors to obtain values for the count and heterogeneity variables. If it is too wide, then we risk including irrelevant neighbors in the construction of the measures. The results are robust to at least a 2,000km band. I also estimate the model with a heterogeneity measure that also includes the major powers in the sampling. The results, which are reported in the robustness section, conform with my hypotheses.

⁸Unit-level characteristics such as political institutions, economic development, and demographics (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, e.g.) can predict civil war, but they might also be correlated with the risk of interstate conflict,

Figure 4: Distribution of the explanatory variables of the model.



tional competition because it increases the number of potential interveners and relevant countries. Because ideas spread across borders, the number of neighbors can also be correlated with changes in domestic politics, so I construct a measure of the number of states within the 2,500km band (capital-to-capital distance) of a given country (*Polity2 neigh. count* and *Liberal neigh. count*).⁹ Level of democracy (*Polity2*), degree of liberalism (*Liberal component index*), and in particular executive constraint (*Exec. constraint*) (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2002) affect the risk of war, but domestic institutions can also be the sender or receiver of ideological diffusion, so they can affect political distance and the heterogeneity of neighbors. Furthermore, if a country went through a regime change in the last three years, it is at increased risk of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Such changes can also affect a country's political distance, in particular if the change were the result of cross-border conflict, so I include a measure of instability (*Instability*) (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and how long the regime has existed (*Age of Regime*).

Other measures also affect the risk of civil war and relationships between countries. Rough terrain makes insurgencies more likely (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and it might also affect political distance by preventing policy diffusion or other interactions across the border (*Rough terrain*). Larger and poorer countries are more likely to experience civil war, and potential interveners are likely to consider size, wealth, and economic growth when deciding to intervene in a country. I therefore include log-transformed population (*ln(Population)*), log-transformed gross domestic product per capita (*ln(GDP per capita)*), and GDP growth (ΔGDP) as control variables. Lastly, because countries might arm themselves to fight civil wars and interstate wars, I include military power (*CINC*) as a RHS variable (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer

including the decision to intervene in a civil war. Countries make decisions on whether to go to war based on the relative strength and prosperity of its target and other unit-level indicators (Bennett and Stam III 2009, ch. 5).

⁹Countries in the sample vary greatly in their number of neighbors. Fiji had one neighbor until 1990, while several European countries have over 50 neighbors, and more so following the end of the Cold War.

1988).

4.1 Temporal and spatial dependencies

Modeling the onset of civil war poses several challenges. First, time is important because younger states can be less stable and the risk of civil war recurrence decreases over time, and time-series-cross-sectional observations are likely to violate the independence assumption of ordinary logit (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). However, I employ several logit-model techniques to account for temporal dependencies. In the main models, I include a decay function of time at peace to account for the risk of civil war over time (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In the robustness section and the appendix I also estimate models using year-fixed effects, which approximates the baseline hazard function (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998), and Carter and Signorino (2010)'s time-cubed procedure. The results are substantively the same. I also include a dummy variable for whether the observation year was during the Cold War, because the structural break after 1991 had a widespread effect on patterns of civil war and intervention (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

Second, I employ spatial regression techniques because both conflicts and regime types tend to be spatially clustered. I include a dummy variable for whether a neighbor is experiencing a civil war (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008), a spatially weighted average of the neighbors' level of democracy (Neigh. Polity2), and dummy variables for each region of the world. Following the main analysis, I also run robustness checks with alternative estimators and other techniques to account for heterogeneity. The results are substantively similar.

5 Analysis

In this section I estimate two statistical models of civil war onset, one using an institutional measure of political distance and heterogeneity and the other using an ideological measure. The results offer support for my hypotheses and suggest that politically moderate countries in highly heterogeneous neighborhoods and political outliers in homogeneous neighborhoods are at the highest risk of war.

Both interaction models offer support for **Hypotheses 1 and 2** (see **Table 3**). The coefficients for *Polity2 distance* and *Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity* are positive, while the interaction term coefficient is negative. These results suggest that institutional distance is associated with an increase in the likelihood of civil war when neighborhood heterogeneity is zero, and vice-versa. The negative coefficient for the interaction term suggests that when neither variable is zero, higher values of both are associated with a decreased likelihood of war. The lower-term coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, while the interaction term coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

The results for the Liberal model (4) are quite similar. Both Liberal distance and neighborhood heterogeneity are positively associated with the likelihood of civil war onset, and the interaction term coefficient is negative. The consistency in the direction of the coefficients across the models offer support for my theory that disagreements over political arrangements are associated with the risk of civil war.

Assessing the relationship between civil war onset and the explanatory variables is difficult because there are numerous potential confounders. We can imagine that some regions are particularly prone to conflict due to historical particularities such as colonialism or resource

Table 3: External causes of civil war

	Polity2		Liberal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Polity2 distance	0.999 (-0.04)	1.506** (3.23)		
Polity2 neigh. heterogeneity	1.114 (1.04)	1.666** (3.00)		
P2 dist. × P2 het.		0.934*** (-3.50)		
Polity2 neigh. count	1.055** (3.11)	1.067*** (3.37)		
Liberal distance			0.305 (-1.22)	496.2** (2.60)
Liberal neigh. heterogeneity			32.49 (1.25)	57854.4** (2.97)
Lib. dist. × Lib. het.				1.10e-16*** (-3.39)
Liberal neigh. count			1.047* (2.57)	1.054** (2.67)
Polity2	1.011 (0.26)	1.002 (0.06)		
Liberal component index			0.179 (-1.49)	0.184 (-1.48)
Exec. constraint	1.005 (0.04)	1.014 (0.11)	1.175 (1.50)	1.162 (1.36)
Instability	2.832*** (3.68)	2.864*** (3.72)	2.716*** (3.70)	2.843*** (3.81)
Age of regime	0.998 (-0.35)	0.998 (-0.41)	0.996 (-0.84)	0.996 (-0.78)
Rough terrain	1.230 (1.64)	1.185 (1.39)	1.224 (1.45)	1.193 (1.33)
ln(Population)	1.358** (3.18)	1.404** (3.27)	1.301** (2.64)	1.282** (2.60)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.957 (-0.25)	0.908 (-0.54)	0.938 (-0.34)	0.874 (-0.73)
Δ GDP	0.000511** (-2.85)	0.000361** (-2.93)	0.000569** (-2.65)	0.000612** (-2.59)
CINC score	0.00566 (-0.72)	0.00224 (-0.87)	0.00253 (-0.77)	0.00124 (-0.89)
Cold war	1.471 (1.00)	1.549 (1.07)	1.337 (0.77)	1.412 (0.89)
Neigh. war	1.156 (0.53)	1.147 (0.50)	1.148 (0.47)	1.101 (0.34)
Neigh. Polity2	1.009 (0.26)	1.016 (0.47)	1.008 (0.22)	1.014 (0.38)
Observations	4240	4240	4113	4113

Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Time variables and geography dummies omitted


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

endowment, and if those regions also have particular distributions of political interests, then my explanatory variables would pick up these relationships rather than the ones I theorize. I rely on several procedures to avoid many of these pitfalls. The results of the models are robust to the inclusion of several controls, including regional dummies, the spatially weighted average regime type of a country's neighbors, and whether there is a civil war across the border. As such, the statistically significant coefficients of my explanatory variables cannot be explained due to the spatial clustering of regime types or conflict. Furthermore, the inclusion of a variable for number of neighbors controls for waves of state formation in the system. Lastly, the various procedures and controls for time suggest that the statistically significant coefficients of the explanatory variables are not due to conflict recurrence in particular countries or due to broader time trends.

5.1 Diagnostics and interpretation

I leverage several different ways of diagnosing and interpreting the coefficients of the interaction models (Braumoeller 2004, Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey 2010, e.g.). I start by calculating the marginal effects of each lower term (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006, p. 73), and plot the average marginal effect of each in **Model 2** conditional on the value of the other (**Figure 5**). The average marginal effect of Polity2 distance declines as Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity increases, but given the wide and overlapping confidence intervals, it is possible that the statistical significance of the regression coefficient is a false positive, which is a particular problem with these kinds of models (Esarey and Sumner 2018). However, the average marginal effect of neighborhood heterogeneity is both positive and significant for lower levels of Polity2 distance.

Figure 5: Marginal effects in Model 2.



Countries in more heterogeneous neighborhoods are at higher risk of experiencing civil war when they are close to the political median of the neighborhood. The graph also shows a clear, negative interaction effect between institutional distance and neighborhood heterogeneity.

A common problem with estimates from interaction models is that these models often violate the linear interaction effect assumption (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu 2018). It is possible that political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity are interacting in non-linear ways, and if there are not sufficient observations for certain values of the variables, marginal effects estimates might be based on extrapolation (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu 2018).¹⁰ To get a better sense of the direction and magnitude of these conditional relationships, I calculate the predicted probabilities of **Models 2** and **4**. In **Table 4**, I calculate the probability of civil war by

¹⁰Further diagnostics of the interaction effect are included in the appendix.

changing the values of one of the explanatory variables, while holding all else at their mean values. For the Polity2 model, institutional distance has a negative relationship with the likelihood of war, but the confidence intervals are overlapping, suggesting there is no relationship. For neighborhood heterogeneity, there is a positive association. As the neighborhood goes from completely homogenous to extremely heterogeneous, there is a 13-fold increase in the risk of war. However, the confidence intervals from the minimum to the maximum overlap. The Liberal model shows a negative but insignificant relationship between distance on onset, and a positive but insignificant effect of heterogeneity on war.

Table 4: Predicted probabilities of civil war

Polity2 model		
Inst. Distance	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0061009	[.0029527, .0113119]
Mean	.00552	[.0031209, .0093782]
Maximum	.0047306	[.0017808, .0107536]
<hr/>		
Neigh. Heterogeneity	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0021042	[.0003652, .0072021]
Mean	.00552	[.0031209, .0093782]
Maximum	.0285016	[.0044922, .0863626]
<hr/>		
Liberal component index model		
Lib. Distance	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0077621	[.0038067, .0142814]
Mean	.0052546	[.0028937, .0090113]
Maximum	.0014796	[.0003844, .0057314]
<hr/>		
Neigh. heterogeneity	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0026474	[.0007406, .0072172]
Mean	.0052546	[.0028937, .0090113]
Maximum	.0157506	[.0036049, .0492243]

Note: Holding all other variables at their mean.

Given the stark interaction effect identified above, I calculate predicted probabilities of the same models as above, but holding the other explanatory variable at the minimum value (still keeping covariates at their mean). The results are significant and the magnitude of the relation-

ships are large (**Table 5**). Now all four variables are positively associated with the risk of civil war onset, and the confidence intervals for the minimum and maximum estimates do not overlap. Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationships are larger. For instance, the probability of war goes from 0.04% to 28.85% as a country in a completely homogenous neighborhood goes from no institutional distance to being an extreme outlier. One noticeable difference between the Polity2 and Liberal models is that the magnitude of the relationships are smaller, particularly between neighborhood heterogeneity and the onset of civil war. One potential explanation for this difference is that regime type is a better predictor of intervention than liberal policies, because third parties seek the former as a way to maintain or remake the latter.

Table 5: Predicted probabilities of civil war

Polity2 model		
Inst. distance	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0004878	[.0000217, .0025083]
Mean	.0021042	[.0003652, .0072021]
Maximum	.2885484	[.0196322, .8085644]
Neigh. heterogeneity	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0004878	[.0000217, .0025083]
Mean	.0061009	[.0029527, .0113119]
Maximum	.2479975	[.023921, .730275]
Liberal component index model		
Lib. distance	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0008359	[.0000924, .0035501]
Mean	.0026474	[.0007406, .0072172]
Maximum	.2627542	[.0094453, .8260517]
Neigh. heterogeneity	Prob. of war	95% confidence intervals
Minimum	.0008359	[.0000924, .0035501]
Mean	.0077621	[.0038067, .0142814]
Maximum	.1613597	[.0216188, .5189956]

Note: Holding other interaction variable at minimum and rest of the variables at their mean.

The limitation of these estimates is that there are few observations at higher values of these variables, which increases the risk of extrapolating. The standard errors reflect this as well.

However, if we look at the predicted probabilities of civil war by either institutional or liberal neighborhood heterogeneity, the confidence intervals for the minimum and mean values do not overlap. In the Polity2 model, as a politically median country goes from a homogenous to an average heterogeneous neighborhood, there is a 12-fold increase in the probability of civil war onset, and the relationship is statistically significant.

These results offer support for my hypotheses for how a country's international neighborhood and its relationships with its neighbors affect the likelihood of experiencing domestic conflict. I find the most robust evidence for the competition pathway, which predicts that neighborhood heterogeneity increases the risk of civil war in politically average countries. One example of this pathway is Pakistan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The country was a mixed regime, but in an above-average heterogeneous neighborhood. Afghanistan, to the north, was autocratic, while India, to the east, was highly democratic. Both countries have a long history of supporting rebel groups in Pakistan. In 1971, separatists in East Pakistan started a civil war, and as fighting intensified and the Pakistani government started a violent crackdown, India intervened on the side of the separatists. The intervention forced the Pakistani government to withdraw, creating the independent state of Bangladesh.¹¹ Other states remain politically moderate, but surrounded by increasingly heterogeneous neighbors. In 1994, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency erupted in Uganda, and over the next several years, Sudan supported to the LRA. While the LRA had been active for years, the intensified fighting coincided with Sudanese support and increased neighborhood heterogeneity.¹²

¹¹Pakistan's Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity is quite stable in the years preceding the war, but its institutional distance (Polity2) shrank, going from 3.878 in 1966 to 2.873 in 1971. As such, it came increasingly vulnerable to the Competition dynamic.

¹²The Sambanis dataset uses 1995 as the starting year of the conflict. In 1990, Uganda's Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity increased from 5.828 in 1990 to 6.53 in 1995, going from below to above the sample mean. In 1995, Sudan was considered an autocracy (Polity2 score of -7), while Uganda was a mixed regime (Polity2 score of -4).

I also find consistent support for the hypothesized domination pathway, with political distance increasing the risk of civil war in homogenous neighborhoods. The relationship is not as strong as the competition pathway, and one explanation might be that homogeneous neighbors are less likely to intervene against an outlier than heterogenous neighbors are, because the former is relatively more secure than the latter group. However, we still observe some cases of the domination pathway. In 1984, after years of planning, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) launched its first major attacks in Turkey, ushering in a civil war that is still ongoing. At the time, Turkey was in a relatively homogenous neighborhood, but a political outlier (its institutional distance was 13.98 in 1984, well above the mean). Two of the principal supporters of the PKK were Syria and Iran, which were both highly autocratic at the time. As such, this case shows how politically dominating countries intervene on the side of the rebels against political outliers.

One important thing to note is to distinguish between absolute levels and changes in political distance, neighborhood heterogeneity, or both. For instance, when the First Intifada started in Israel in December 1987, Israel was a political outlier in a homogenous neighborhood. Many countries, including its autocratic rivals, supported the Palestine Liberation Organization, suggesting a Domination dynamic. However, in the years leading up to the Intifada, Israel's political distance to its neighbors decreased while the neighborhood became increasingly heterogeneous.¹³

¹³Israel's institutional distance (Polity2) went from 14.26 in 1977 to 11.98 in 1987. The Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity, however, went from 1.65 to 2.15 in the same period, and in the year after the Intifada started, heterogeneity jumped to 5.53.

5.2 Robustness

I perform a wide range of robustness-checks using different estimators and other techniques (additional robustness checks are reported in the appendix).

Table 6: Robustness checks

	Major powers (5)	Rare-events logit (6)	Year-fixed effects (7)	Random effects (8)
Polity2 distance	1.449* (2.50)	1.507** (3.25)	1.560** (3.19)	1.005** (2.95)
Polity2 neigh. heterogeneity	1.542* (2.28)	1.648** (2.96)	1.756** (3.16)	1.004** (2.69)
Polity2 distance × Polity2 neigh. heterogeneity	0.944* (−2.42)	0.934*** (−3.49)	0.927*** (−3.55)	0.999** (−2.86)
Observations	4349	4240	3086	4240

Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Control variables, time variables, and geography dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

First, the 2,500km band defines a sample of potential interveners and other relevant countries. The shortcoming of this type of sampling is that it often misses the major powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China), so I include those in an alternative measure of heterogeneity. The effects are somewhat smaller, with larger standard errors, but the coefficients remain statistically significant and in the directions hypothesized (**Model 5, Table 6**).¹⁴ One potential issue with this expanded measure of heterogeneity, and a potential explanation for the larger standard errors, is that adding these countries to the sampling procedure means adding the same five countries to every country, for ever year. There is no cross-sectional variation when these countries are included, so by construction every country would be affected by the major powers' distribution of political interests, but more or less so depending on how many neighbors it has. The sampling procedure therefore affects countries' neighborhood heterogeneity differently depending on geography, without a clear theoretical motivation.

¹⁴The p-values are 0.012, 0.016, and 0.015 for Polity2, Neighborhood heterogeneity, and the interaction coefficient, respectively)

A more radical rethinking of the implicit sampling of relevant countries and potential interveners would be to rely on the politically-relevant dyad definition (contiguous neighbors and major powers). As I report in the appendix, I estimate models with the Polity2 and Liberal variables constructed from such a sampling. None of these models produce statistically significant results, which suggests that including only major powers and contiguous neighbors as relevant countries is overly restrictive. It is akin to saying that Iran is not relevant to the Syrian Civil War, because it is neither a major power nor a contiguous neighbor.

I also estimate the main model using alternative estimators: rare-events logit (6), year-fixed effects logit (7), and random-effects logit (8). The results for Polity2 distance and neighborhood heterogeneity are both consistent in direction and statistical significance. One noteworthy difference from the main models is that with random effects, the coefficients are substantially smaller. This change is likely due to these models accounting for more across-unit variation than the simple logit models. That the direction and significance of the coefficients remain the same, however, offer further support for my hypotheses.

My theory specifies that fundamental disagreements over institutions and ideology affect the risk of civil war. However, my measurements of regime type and liberalism might be proxying for more concrete disagreements over policy. I therefore construct two sets of alternative explanatory variables. First, I use the ideal point measure of state preferences based on United Nations General Assembly voting (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017). Second, I use a variable that measures a country's capital account openness (Chinn and Ito 2006). Both measure policy disagreements more directly than the Polity2 and Liberal variables.

I estimate models with ideal point and trade openness distance and neighborhood heterogeneity, with and without the institutional and ideological explanatory variables. The results

Table 7: Alternative measures of political distance and heterogeneity

	Ideal points			Trade openness		
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Ideal point distance	0.712 (-0.46)	0.628 (-0.67)	0.686 (-0.53)			
Ideal neigh. heterogeneity	1.282 (0.32)	0.838 (-0.22)	0.883 (-0.14)			
Ideal dist. × Ideal neigh. het.	0.976 (-0.03)	1.125 (0.14)	1.007 (0.01)			
Openness distance				0.357 (-1.51)	0.543 (-0.89)	0.399 (-1.28)
Openness neigh. heterogeneity				1.425 (0.67)	1.428 (0.66)	1.501 (0.73)
Openness dist. × Openness het.				2.314 (1.86)	1.722 (1.23)	2.075 (1.56)
Polity2 distance		1.567*** (3.43)			1.311 (1.83)	
Polity2 neigh. heterogeneity		1.696** (2.94)			1.466* (1.98)	
P2 dist. × P2. het.		0.928*** (-3.66)			0.955* (-1.96)	
Liberal distance			4673.8*** (3.31)			126.0 (1.39)
Liberal neigh. heterogeneity			474154.6*** (3.34)			31822.3* (2.26)
Lib. dist. × Lib. het.			2.45e-22*** (-4.22)			9.73e-18** (-2.58)
Observations	3979	3938	3774	2571	2500	2450

Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Control variables, time variables, and geography dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

show that neither ideal points nor openness are associated with the risk of civil war onset (**Table 7**) alone. When I include the ideal point variables with the institutional and ideological variables, the former coefficients remain insignificant while the latter remain statistically significant in the directions theorized. As such, the results for regime type and liberalism appear to be capturing relationships distinct from any general policy disagreement.

The results for the openness models are less clear. The openness variables are never statistically significant, but when included alongside the institutional and ideological variables, the p-values of the latter coefficients drop, with some becoming statistically insignificant. One potential explanation for these null results is that the Chinn-Ito dataset only covers the period 1970-2016, which results in a substantially smaller sample size for the openness models. The pattern of missingness suggests that it is not random. For instance, 59 of the 119 observations with civil war onset have missing data for openness.

6 Conclusion

We must consider the interaction between domestic and international politics to understand the causes of civil war. Since most civil wars experience intervention in some form or another, domestic actors make decisions based on expectations of external support, and this can disrupt domestic bargaining. Opposition groups are more likely to expect help, and therefore start a war, from politically distant neighbors. However, other countries' willingness to intervene depends on the level of international competition. I argue that politically moderate countries in highly heterogeneous neighborhoods are at the highest risk of experiencing civil war, followed by political outliers in otherwise homogeneous neighborhoods.

I find support for my hypotheses, and the predicted probabilities suggest the magnitude of these relationships are large. For instance, in the institutional model (Polity2), a politically moderate country in an average heterogeneous neighborhood is 12 times more likely to experience civil war onset than a moderate country in a homogeneous neighborhood. I also estimate other models, including using more policy-related explanatory variables. None of these alternative models produce statistically significant results, which supports my argument that more deep-seated disagreements about domestic political arrangements are driving expectations over intervention and competition.

There are several implications of these results. They suggest the need for models of civil war onset that condition on a country's relationship with its neighbors, but also more theoretical development on the structural causes of civil war. While the Cold War was perhaps the high mark of global rivalries driving domestic conflict, the phenomenon has not gone away. The rise of regional rivalries in both the Middle East and East Asia could mean a resurgence of proxy wars, as competing powers promote domestic instability in other countries.

The results also highlight an underappreciated aspect of civil wars in an international context. If sudden shifts in neighborhood heterogeneity affect political competition, then domestic shocks, such as coups and revolutions, can reverberate abroad and across regions. Countries that undergo significant political change can become the target of intervention, but if they become more extreme than their neighbors, then they might seek to spread their new political preferences abroad. For instance, revolutionary states such as Iran have intervened extensively in other countries' civil wars, but the risks of such domestic shocks might be broader. With many countries going through democratic reversal, this change can increase international competition and thus the risk of conflict.

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Appendix for "International Competition and the Onset of Civil War"

August 28, 2019

1 Non-linear interaction

To better assess the nature of the interaction effect, I use the Inteff package (Karaka-Mandic, Norton and Dowd 2012), **Figure 6**, which plots the individual interaction effect of every observation in the sample. It shows that for many observations across the logit-curve, the individual interaction effect is negative and of greater magnitude than the fitted line would suggest. In addition, **Figure 7** shows the z-statistic of each individual observation's interaction effect. While many fall within the 95th confidence interval, many do not. For lower probabilities of civil war onset, there are some observations with a statistically significant and positive interaction effect. However, the majority of observations outside of the confidence interval have a negative interaction. As such, there appears to be a statistically significant and negative interaction effect for lower and higher-risk observations, but the effect could be non-linear.

Figure 1: Plotting individual interaction effects.





Figure 2: Statistical significance and interaction effects.



2 Additional robustness checks

Table 1 reports the results of the following logit models; using the time-cubed procedure; country-fixed effects; using the distance rule for the W-matrix from Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008), with minimum distance for neighbors within 950km and capital-to-capital distance for everyone else; only including countries with a GDP per capita of less than \$1,000; dropping all observations with Polity2 distance at or above 12; and dropping all observations with Polity2 neighborhood heterogeneity at or above 10.

Table 1: Robustness checks

	Time-cubed (15)	Country-fixed effects (16)	Buhaug and Gleditsch (17)	Poor countries (18)	P2 dist < 12 (19)	P2 neigh. het. < 10 (20)
Polity2 distance	1.501*** (3.34)	1.004** (2.84)	1.546*** (3.74)	1.507* (2.46)	1.714** (2.88)	1.510** (3.18)
Polity2 neigh. heterogeneity	1.696** (3.20)	1.003* (1.99)	1.904*** (3.58)	1.618* (2.42)	1.734** (2.78)	1.692** (2.95)
P2 dist. × P2. het.	0.933*** (−3.64)	0.999* (−2.56)	0.932*** (−4.10)	0.928** (−2.73)	0.921** (−2.94)	0.933*** (−3.44)
Polity2 neigh. count	1.064** (2.83)	1.000 (−0.33)	1.066*** (3.30)	1.045 (1.42)	1.064** (3.19)	1.067*** (3.34)
Polity2	0.997 (−0.09)	0.999 (−0.88)	1.014 (0.30)	1.001 (0.02)	1.001 (0.03)	1.003 (0.08)
Exec. constraint	1.035 (0.28)	1.003 (0.84)	0.979 (−0.17)	1.130 (0.92)	0.993 (−0.05)	1.012 (0.10)
Instability	2.866*** (3.57)	1.030** (2.73)	3.153*** (3.90)	1.645 (1.29)	2.685*** (3.31)	2.845*** (3.70)
Age of regime	0.996 (−0.75)	1.000 (−1.27)	1.001 (0.18)	1.006 (0.78)	0.998 (−0.40)	0.998 (−0.40)
Rough terrain	1.185 (1.32)	1 (.)	1.134 (1.01)	1.245 (1.58)	1.222 (1.58)	1.180 (1.34)
ln(Population)	1.382** (3.00)	0.996 (−0.29)	1.364** (2.87)	1.578** (3.13)	1.293* (2.21)	1.399** (3.25)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.796 (−1.05)	0.992 (−1.21)	0.943 (−0.31)	1.233 (0.53)	0.870 (−0.74)	0.914 (−0.50)
Δ GDP	0.000362** (−2.73)	0.878 (−1.97)	0.000376** (−2.74)	0.00100 (−1.33)	0.000381** (−2.93)	0.000373** (−2.92)
CINC score	0.0231 (−0.52)	0.861 (−0.63)	0.0948 (−0.31)	2.37e−13*** (−3.45)	0.0116 (−0.60)	0.00226 (−0.87)
Cold war	1.348 (0.39)	0.999 (−0.13)	1.747 (1.26)	1.328 (0.46)	1.648 (1.21)	1.560 (1.08)
Neigh. war	1.095 (0.31)	1.009 (1.61)	1.364 (1.08)	1.374 (1.04)	1.109 (0.37)	1.155 (0.53)
Neigh. Polity2	1.018 (0.47)	0.999 (−0.96)	1.002 (0.05)	0.999 (−0.02)	1.036 (0.87)	1.017 (0.48)
Observations	4240	4240	3879	1666	3953	4192

Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Time variables and geography dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results largely support my hypotheses. In particular, it is noteworthy that the results

hold while dropping observations with extreme values for Polity2 distance and neighborhood heterogeneity. These models might even produce more accurate estimates, since they reduce the risk of extrapolation.

3 Politically relevant dyads

The constructions of the political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity measures in the main models are based on an implicit sampling of which other countries are relevant to a given country. By using minimum distance to weight neighbors' relevance in the W-matrix for the construction of the political distance measure, I implicitly assume that relevance is defined by spatial proximity. Similarly, I define the neighborhood as countries within a band of minimum distance to the given country. However, the set of countries relevant to a given country's risk of civil war might not hinge on geography. Instead, other factors, such as power (which affects the capability to intervene), might be as important or more important as proximity. Therefore, I construct alternative measures of distance and heterogeneity, using politically-relevant dyads to determine the relevant countries. Specifically, political distance is defined as the absolute difference between a given country's score (on Polity2 or Liberal component index) and the mean of every politically relevant country (i.e. contiguous neighbors and major powers). Similarly, neighborhood heterogeneity is the standard deviation of the scores of every politically relevant country to a given country.

These alternative measures differ from the main measures in several ways. All the PRD variables have a higher mean than their main model counterparts, but smaller standard deviations. They also appear to be measuring different things, as the PRD variables are not highly corre-

lated with their counterparts. The political distance variables have the highest correlations, with 0.284 for the two Polity2 distance variables and 0.2646 for the two Liberal distance variables. For neighborhood heterogeneity, the correlations are 0.0927 for the Polity2 variables and 0.0412 for the Liberal variables.

With these new measures, I estimate a set of models similar to the main Polity2 and Liberal models (**Table 2**), with and without the interaction term. None of the models produce statistically significant results, so I fail to reject the null that there is no association between the risk of civil war onset and the interaction of political distance and neighborhood heterogeneity. Given that main models and the various robustness checks find support for my theory, these null results suggest politically-relevant dyads are not an appropriate basis for defining a country's neighborhood. This sampling procedure gives greater weight to major powers, but significantly reduces the number of other relevant countries. In particular, countries once- or twice-removed from a given country are in most cases no longer included in the construction of the measures, which is tantamount to saying that they are not relevant. For example, this is equivalent to saying that Iran was not relevant to the onset of the Syrian Civil War.

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Table 2: Distance and heterogeneity with politically-relevant dyads only

	Polity2 (PRD)		Liberal (PRD)	
	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Polity2 distance	1.008 (0.14)	1.313 (1.66)		
Polity2 neigh. het.	0.872 (-0.89)	1.060 (0.27)		
P2 dist. × P2 neigh. het.		0.965 (-1.56)		
Polity2 neigh. count	1.050** (2.85)	1.050** (2.89)		
Liberal distance			0.541 (-0.52)	103.5 (0.58)
Liberal neigh. heterogeneity			0.0644 (-0.65)	1.083 (0.01)
Lib dist. × Lib. het.				0.000000176 (-0.68)
Liberal neigh. count			1.051** (2.80)	1.053** (2.78)
Polity2	1.013 (0.38)	1.014 (0.39)		
Liberal component index			0.106* (-1.99)	0.108* (-1.99)
Exec. constraint	0.987 (-0.12)	0.990 (-0.09)	1.137 (1.25)	1.140 (1.28)
Instability	3.266*** (4.16)	3.198*** (4.12)	3.150*** (4.22)	3.148*** (4.24)
Age of regime	0.998 (-0.53)	0.997 (-0.59)	0.994 (-1.22)	0.995 (-1.12)
Rough terrain	1.297* (2.10)	1.292* (2.03)	1.287 (1.67)	1.284 (1.69)
ln(Population)	1.336** (3.06)	1.333** (3.03)	1.296** (2.61)	1.300** (2.63)
ln(GDP per capita)	0.972 (-0.18)	0.976 (-0.15)	1.097 (0.50)	1.103 (0.52)
Δ GDP	0.000650** (-2.74)	0.000616** (-2.76)	0.000715* (-2.57)	0.000738* (-2.56)
CINC score	0.00420 (-0.75)	0.00509 (-0.75)	0.00121 (-0.86)	0.000233 (-0.93)
Cold war	1.672 (1.33)	1.642 (1.31)	1.388 (0.77)	1.415 (0.81)
Neigh. war	1.167 (0.58)	1.145 (0.50)	1.064 (0.23)	1.033 (0.12)
Neigh. Polity2	0.984 (-0.40)	0.983 (-0.42)	1.000 (-0.01)	0.998 (-0.05)
Observations	4466	4466	4244	4244

Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Time variables and geography dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$