Picture courtesy of Erwin Franzen
Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War
My dissertation develops an international theory of civil war and examines when and why civil wars become international conflicts. I currently have two working papers based on chapters of the dissertation.
"Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War" (working paper, PDF)
Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze a formal model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation where the domestic government, but not the rebels, are uncertain about whether a third party will intervene. The domestic government risks war with the rebels when it is uncertain about intervention, but the type of war that follows depends on how much there is to gain from war expansion and the autonomy costs the rebels incur for external support. Interstate war occurs when the domestic government has much to gain from expansion and the rebels pay few costs for support. The model provides an international and informational explanation for civil war; it shows that common predictors of civil war, such as intervener-rebel relations, have conditional effects on conflict onset; and it demonstrates that uncertainty over intervention can cause peace or interstate war, depending on the stakes of the war.
Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze a formal model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation where the domestic government, but not the rebels, are uncertain about whether a third party will intervene. The domestic government risks war with the rebels when it is uncertain about intervention, but the type of war that follows depends on how much there is to gain from war expansion and the autonomy costs the rebels incur for external support. Interstate war occurs when the domestic government has much to gain from expansion and the rebels pay few costs for support. The model provides an international and informational explanation for civil war; it shows that common predictors of civil war, such as intervener-rebel relations, have conditional effects on conflict onset; and it demonstrates that uncertainty over intervention can cause peace or interstate war, depending on the stakes of the war.
"International Competition and the Onset of Civil War" (working paper, PDF)
A country's international environment and relationship with its neighbors can affect its risk of civil war, because beliefs about potential intervention can disrupt domestic bargaining. Two factors shape how expectations of intervention cause the outbreak of fighting. First, political distance with a third party determines whether rebels or governments expect support. Second, the level of international competition amongst the neighbors can encourage or constrain third parties' willingness to intervene. These factors interact to produce two pathways for international factors to cause civil war. Politically moderate countries in heterogeneous areas are at the highest risk of experiencing civil war, while political outliers in homogenous neighborhoods are also at increased risk of conflict. I estimate several empirical models using spatial regression techniques and find consistent and robust evidence for a relationship between international competition and the risk of civil war onset.
A country's international environment and relationship with its neighbors can affect its risk of civil war, because beliefs about potential intervention can disrupt domestic bargaining. Two factors shape how expectations of intervention cause the outbreak of fighting. First, political distance with a third party determines whether rebels or governments expect support. Second, the level of international competition amongst the neighbors can encourage or constrain third parties' willingness to intervene. These factors interact to produce two pathways for international factors to cause civil war. Politically moderate countries in heterogeneous areas are at the highest risk of experiencing civil war, while political outliers in homogenous neighborhoods are also at increased risk of conflict. I estimate several empirical models using spatial regression techniques and find consistent and robust evidence for a relationship between international competition and the risk of civil war onset.
Data collection: Civil War Expansion Dataset (CWED)
As part of the dissertation project, I am also collecting data on the expansion of civil wars. CWED measures whether and what type(s) of retaliation civil war governments conduct against external rebel supporters. The Department of Government and the Clements Center on National Security and Strategy at the University of Texas at Austin have provided generous support for research assistance.
As part of the dissertation project, I am also collecting data on the expansion of civil wars. CWED measures whether and what type(s) of retaliation civil war governments conduct against external rebel supporters. The Department of Government and the Clements Center on National Security and Strategy at the University of Texas at Austin have provided generous support for research assistance.