Picture courtesy of Erwin Franzen

Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War

My dissertation develops an international theory of civil war and examines when and why civil wars become international conflicts. I currently have two working papers based on chapters of the dissertation.

"Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War" (working paper, PDF)
Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I argue that two factors are important: the domestic government's ability to credibly threaten to retaliate against a third-party intervener, thereby expanding the conflict and raising the stakes; and whether the rebels prefer fighting alone or with external support. I analyze a formal model of civil war onset, intervention, and retaliation that shows interstate war happens when (a) the local stakes are moderately high, (b) the costs of fighting are low, and (c) the domestic government has some retaliatory capabilities. The model also has implications for the onset of civil war, providing an international and informational explanation for civil war. Lastly, when accounting for the strategic interaction, common predictors of civil war, such as intervener-rebel relations, change directions depending on the credibility of retaliation and rebel aims.

"International Competition and the Onset of Civil War" (working paper, PDF)
A country's international environment and relationship with its neighbors can affect its risk of civil war. Domestic actors have expectations about interventions, so potential foreign intervention can cause the outbreak of domestic conflict. Intervention, and thus civil war, depends on the political distance between a country and its neighbors. However, the level of international competition amongst the neighbors determines who intervenes where. I estimate several empirical models, and find a country's political distance to its neighbors and neighborhood heterogeneity increase the risk of civil war, but their effects are conditional. Politically moderate countries in heterogeneous areas are at the highest risk of experiencing civil war, while political outliers in homogenous neighborhoods are also at increased risk of conflict. These findings have implications for how we think about the causes of civil war and the need for nested models of conflict.

Cyber Security and Power

Before coming to UT Austin, I spent several years working on the theoretical, strategic, and policy dimensions of cyber security, resulting in various publications. My main interest revolves around questions about power, and how the information revolution has affected states' ability to coerce other states. I am currently working on a theoretical paper addressing these issues.

"Mutually Assured Vulnerability: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Coercion and Power in Cyberspace" (working paper, PDF)
Despite years of debate and a growing body of scholarship, the future of cyber conflict remains unclear. The discussion has hinged on the arrival (or lack thereof) of some kind of cyber war, but the almost exclusive focus on a very specific phenomenon has stymied efforts to understand the actual object of analysis: cyberspace. This paper proposes a new study to cyber security where cyberspace is conceived of as an ecological system where the actors and the structure interact. By identifying the defining characteristics of cyberspace itself we can better understand the sources of cyber power, and thus how actors can achieve their political goals. Because cyberspace is a malleable system, the implication is that actors will attempt to change the structure itself in order to achieve strategic advantages. Coupled with asymmetric information and offensive advantage, this causes severe collective action problems between states and the deterioration of the viability of cyberspace as open system. (For the NUPI working papers series version, see here. For the most recent version, shoot me an email.)

"Cyber Security Capacity Building: Security and Freedom." NUPI Report, 2016.
The threats associated with ICT are multifaceted. The present report posits that cyber capacity building (CCB) should not be considered simply a risk management endeavor. The potential for malware, cyber attacks, and cyber crime are not the only challenges associated with the rapid spread of ICT. Policymakers must also consider the intersection of technology and politics, particularly in developing countries still transitioning into democracies.

"Den Akademiske Debatten om Cybersikkerhet" (in English, "The Academic Debate Regarding Cyber Security"). Internasjonal Politikk 71, no. 2 (May 2013): 229-240.

"Competing Academic Approaches to Cyber Security." In Conflict in Cyber Space, edited by Karsten Friis and Jens Ringsmose. London: Routledge, 2016. (NUPI working paper version)
Much has been written on the subject of cyber security over the past two decades, but there remain significant shortcomings in the literature. Cyber security is a field filled with fundamental conceptual, theoretical and empirical disagreements, making any systematic analysis of cyberspace difficult. This paper seeks to categorize the various approaches, here referred to as schools of thought, to cyber security and identify the sources of their disagreements. Much of the academic and policy debate has revolved around the “revolutionist” and “traditionalist” schools of thought, with debates over cyberwar and the efficacy of strategic information warfare. However, none of the schools offer a systematic approach to understanding the strategic utility of cyberspace. This paper identifies a third, less known approach that is best described as “environmentalist.” The “environmentalist” school’s approach to cyber power and analysis of cyberspace as a distinct environment or system offers the best way forward for the field.