Picture courtesy of Erwin Franzen
Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War
My book project develops an international theory of civil war and examines when and why civil wars become international conflicts. I currently have one published paper based on this project, as well as a new dataset and a related working paper.
"Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War" (OnlineFirst in Conflict Management and Peace Science, PDF, appendix)
Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze an asymmetric information model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation with endogenous stakes. Interstate war occurs when rebels believe the threat of intervention will compel the government to acquiesce, the third party believes the government will tolerate an intervention, but they both underestimate the government's resolve. The model also has implications for civil wars. Retaliation can deter intervention and rebellion, but intervention can either deter rebellion or compel the government into giving up power, depending on whether the rebels are susceptible to foreign influence.
Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I analyze an asymmetric information model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation with endogenous stakes. Interstate war occurs when rebels believe the threat of intervention will compel the government to acquiesce, the third party believes the government will tolerate an intervention, but they both underestimate the government's resolve. The model also has implications for civil wars. Retaliation can deter intervention and rebellion, but intervention can either deter rebellion or compel the government into giving up power, depending on whether the rebels are susceptible to foreign influence.
"Intervention at your own peril: patterns of war expansion and retaliation" (PDF)
Most civil wars attract external intervention, with rebels often receiving external support from other states. However, interventions are not without risks. Domestic governments can and do retaliate against third-party rebel supporters, sometimes expanding the civil war into interstate war. In this paper, I present the Civil Wars Expansion Dataset (CWED), which captures various types of retaliation by domestic governments against external rebel supporters. It is the first global dataset of retaliation, and covers all civil wars with rebel-sided intervention in the period 1975-2009. Using this data, I estimate a statistical model of civil war intervention and retaliation, using urban population as a proxy for escalation costs from war expansion. My statistical analysis shows that countries with higher urban population are more likely to attract intervention and less likely to retaliate. Similarly, third parties with larger urban populations are less likely to intervene than stay out of a civil war.
Most civil wars attract external intervention, with rebels often receiving external support from other states. However, interventions are not without risks. Domestic governments can and do retaliate against third-party rebel supporters, sometimes expanding the civil war into interstate war. In this paper, I present the Civil Wars Expansion Dataset (CWED), which captures various types of retaliation by domestic governments against external rebel supporters. It is the first global dataset of retaliation, and covers all civil wars with rebel-sided intervention in the period 1975-2009. Using this data, I estimate a statistical model of civil war intervention and retaliation, using urban population as a proxy for escalation costs from war expansion. My statistical analysis shows that countries with higher urban population are more likely to attract intervention and less likely to retaliate. Similarly, third parties with larger urban populations are less likely to intervene than stay out of a civil war.
Data collection: Civil War Expansion Dataset (CWED)
As part of the dissertation project, I am also collecting data on the expansion of civil wars. CWED measures whether and what type(s) of retaliation civil war governments conduct against external rebel supporters. The Department of Government and the Clements Center on National Security and Strategy at the University of Texas at Austin have provided generous support for research assistance.
As part of the dissertation project, I am also collecting data on the expansion of civil wars. CWED measures whether and what type(s) of retaliation civil war governments conduct against external rebel supporters. The Department of Government and the Clements Center on National Security and Strategy at the University of Texas at Austin have provided generous support for research assistance.